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Abstract:  
In implementing its patent-related obligations to the TRIPS Agreement, India decided to use the 
optional additional transitional provisions in Article 65(4). Thus, delaying the introduction of product 
patents in exempt technologies, notably pharmaceuticals, till 1 January 2005. Ostensibly, this gave it 
the opportunity to exploit changing circumstances to and emergent views on TRIPS-implementation; 
in particular exploring new interpretations to residual flexibility in TRIPS and any continuing legal 
ambiguity in TRIPS obligations. In terms of the latter, the Panel Report in Canada – Patent Protection 
of Pharmaceutical Products is pertinent in having exhibited rare reticence in stepping back from 
defining the principle of non-discrimination in Article 27(1), TRIPS Agreement. While maintaining 
legal ambiguity, this reticence also provides space for law-making and regulatory diversity. The article 
reviews the three amendments to India’s Patent Act, 1970 and finds mixed use of residual flexibility 
and some evidence of efforts to explore legal ambiguity. Thus, despite a favourable climate to TRIPS 
implementation and an active transnational access to medicine campaign, legislators in India have 
demonstrated a degree of caution. The article concludes that this caution is best explained in terms of 
deepening ambivalence concerning intellectual property within the government and the changing 
economic interests of sections of Indian pharma. 
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CONTEXT AND AMBIGUITY: A COMMENT ON AMENDING INDIA’S 
PATENT ACT 
 
I. Introduction 
In many senses, the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organisation in 1994, which also led to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property,1 heralds a unique phase of transglobal governance. Beyond its (high) 
universal minimum standards, the TRIPs Agreement incorporates strong surveillance 
provisions. Law-making in the South has possibly not previously witnessed such scrutiny and 
surveillance. Ironically, the focussed attention on implementing obligations to the TRIPs 
Agreement has also generated proliferation of forums and diversity of actors. In particular, 
forum-proliferation and intervention from non-state actors like global civil society has 
transformed the context of TRIPs-implementation. Beyond mitigating some of the technical 
and procedural asymmetries in negotiating TRIPs, these developments have called into 
question the principles that guide the transglobal governance of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs); thus, opening-up what was deemed to be settled principles within TRIPs. And, there 
have been concrete successes like the Doha Declaration on Public Health.2 The scrutiny of 
implementation also comes with a vast growth in the legal, economic and policy literature. 
This literature seeks to identify residual flexibility in TRIPs that may promote (and protect) 
access to medicine, seeds, educational material and also the rights of users and traditional 
                                                
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. (1994) 81; henceforth, TRIPS 
Agreement. 
2 WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, at Doha Ministerial Conference, 9-14 
November 2001. WT/Min(01)/Dec/W/2; henceforth, WTO, Doha Declaration. 
Dwijen Page 4 of 32 
<Directory> Last printed 28/03/07 
 
communities3. No doubt, there are multiple ways in which these obligations may be 
honoured; thus, suggesting that beyond residual flexibility there also is legal ambiguity. 
 The ambiguity is not merely a matter of different interpretations to TRIPs provisions 
but also a recognition that in certain instances the Agreement does not spell out its 
provisions. For example, in Article 27(3)(b), where Member countries are obliged to protect 
plant varieties ‘either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination 
thereof’. While the Agreement has ample provisions concerning patents it is silent on the 
parameters of an ‘effective sui generis system’. There is more to this notion of legal 
ambiguity. Here, the Panel Report in Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products 
is pertinent.4 Among the issues addressed, the Panel also had to deliberate on the principle 
of non-discrimination in Article 27(1).5 Despite an elaborate discussion, the Panel remained 
reticent and stepped back from defining the principle. Thus, generating legal ambiguity and 
potentially providing space for law-making by Member countries. In the face of legal 
ambiguity, Member countries have an opportunity for some autonomous action to build the 
architecture of domestic law in a way that promotes a desired policy objective that may 
otherwise be compromised by TRIPs. 
 How then has the changing context to TRIPs-implementation and prevailing legal 
ambiguity in TRIPs-provisions been either grasped and exploited in the South? For that 
matter, as we change our attention from concrete successes at Geneva, do we see those 
successes translated into statutory provisions in the South? In attempting to answer these 
questions the paper looks at India’s implementation of patent-related obligations to TRIPs. In 
                                                
3 See for example, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights 
and Development Policy, (London 2002). 
4 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada – Generics), 
WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000; henceforth Canada – Generics. 
5 This article requires patents to be available and enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of 
technology, the place of invention and whether the products are imported or locally produced. Section 
III below discusses this Article and the Canada – Generics Panel Report. 
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this respect, the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Right Act, 2001 is remarkable. 
Not only is it globally unique in accommodating rights for farmers and breeders within a 
single instrument but it is equally significant in differing from the template that has dominated 
the regulatory landscape of plant variety protection and Article 27(3)(b). Any study of Article 
27(3)(b) and India’s law would map this characteristic feature of exploring residual flexibility 
and ambiguity in the TRIPS Agreement and demonstrating how the statute incorporates 
principles from countervailing forums like the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation. 
With respect to its patent-related obligations, India decided to use the additional transitional 
provisions in Article 65(4); thus giving itself a final compliance date of 1 January 2005 for 
product patents in exempt technologies, notably pharmaceutical products. Thus, giving the 
opportunity to explore opportunities arising from the changing contexts to TRIPs-
implementation and continuing legal ambiguity in TRIPs. This makes sense for a country that 
has consistently resisted moving intellectual property into General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade.6 With these insights the article focuses on the series of amendments enacted to 
India’s Patent Act, 1970 (IPA, henceforth) and pays particular attention to the third and final 
amendment in 2005 which introduced product patents in pharmaceuticals. In contrast to 
earlier amendments, the final amendment raised a relatively muted rhetoric7 and exhibited a 
remarkably shared consensus (amongst critical commentators)8. The focus of the article is 
                                                
6 Chakravarti Raghavan, Recolonisation: GATT, the Uruguay Round and the Third World, London, UK 
and Penang, Malaysia: Zed Books and Third World Network 1990), see Chapter 12, pp265-81. 
7 Here, compare Sukumar Muralidharan, Patent Capitulation, Frontline, vol. 15, (1998), pp. 100-101. 
and R Ramachandran, Disquiet over a New Regime, Frontline, vol. 15, (1999), pp. 90-91 (writing 
about the first amendment) with V. Sridhar and Siddharth Narrain, A Tempered Patents Regime, 
Frontline, vol. 22, (2005), pp. 28-32 and B. Punj, Patent Debate: An Unhealthy Plan for the Poor, The 
Indian Express, (New Delhi 2005) (writing on the third amendment) 
8 By way of example, recall the different opinions concerning the choice between using the additional 
transitional provisions or coming into full compliance at an early stage (see Sukumar Muralidharan, 
Patent Capitulation, Frontline, vol. 15, (1998), pp. 100-101 and Dwijen Rangnekar, This patent bill 
won’t please WTO, Economic Times, 28 December 1998). 
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neither on the shared consensus amongst critical commentators9 nor identifying the 
‘fountainhead of ideas’ or the process of cognitive lock-in. Rather, it explores whether this 
consensus set too narrow an agenda for the third amendment; thus, failing to explore 
opportunities from delayed full compliance. In particular, were opportunities from changing 
context or continuing legal ambiguity not grasped? By focussing on domestic law-making, 
rather than in the Geneva process, the article seeks to draw attention to other factors that 
influence TRIPS implementation. In the case of India, the article concludes that the 
architecture of patent law is reflective of ambivalence within government and the changing 
self-interest of sections of Indian pharma. 
 The paper begins with a discussion of the globalisation of intellectual property rights 
where the changing circumstances to TRIPS Agreement implementation is analysed. This is 
followed by a discussion of the Panel Report in the Canada – Generics case. Here, particular 
attention is given to the Panel’s discussion of the principle of non-discrimination in Article 
27(1). Having mapped the context and identified the legal ambiguity (cf. Article 27(1)), the 
article discusses the three amendments to IPA. A conclusion closes the paper by drawing 
attention to ambivalence within the government and changing interests amongst sections of 
Indian pharma. 
II. Limits to Globalising Intellectual Property Rights 
A. The Globalisation of Intellectual Property Rights 
Three phases have been identified in the evolving architecture of global intellectual property 
governance: national, international and global.10 A key feature differentiating the periods is 
the shrinking contours of the space for the sovereign determination of the protection to be 
granted within national territory. The global phase was initiated by the Uruguay Round 
                                                
9 I explore this elsewhere; see Dwijen Rangnekar, ‘No Pills for Poor People? Understanding the 
Disembowelment of India’s Patent Regime’, XLI Economic and Political Weekly 409 (2006). 
10 Peter Drahos, 'Thinking Strategically About Intellectual Property Rights', 21 Telecommunications 
Policy 201 (1997). 
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negotiations. To reiterate well rehearsed statements, the TRIPs Agreement not only 
consolidates pre-existing IP Conventions in a single agreement but is also comprehensive in 
its coverage of different instruments of IPRs. It goes well beyond previous multilateral 
treaties by establishing (high) universal minimum standards with time-tabled implementation 
and backed by regular surveillance for compliance. Finally, there is the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system where these obligations are enforced and non-compliance dealt with by 
cross-sectoral sanctions. 
These transformations are symptomatic of deeper reconfiguration of the space 
occupied by the state. While not altering territorial borders, contemporary globalisation 
seriously impacts the institutional encasement of national territory.11 The reconstituted state, 
as it engages with supraterritorial organizations (and treaties), has to deal with multi-layered 
forms of governance which challenge its primacy as the site for scripting rules and providing 
governance. What Jan Aart Scholte terms transglobal governance exists in the TRIPs 
Agreement’s surveillance provisions.12 Member countries are obliged to report to and have 
their compliance reviewed by the TRIPs Council. This web of surveillance is completed by 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement process.13 None of this should suggest that states engage in and 
get impacted by these supraterritorial treaties in a similar manner. Global treaties are 
                                                
11 S. Sassen, 'Territory and Territoriality in the Global Economy', 15 International Sociology 372 
(2000). 
12 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, (2nd ed. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2005). 
13 Peter Drahos, 'Bits and Bips. Bilateralism in Intellectual Property', 4 The Journal of World Intellectual 
Property 791 (2001). 
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inherently unbalanced and more powerful states succeed in extracting greater concessions.14 
Empirical studies assessing TRIPs Agreement outcomes corroborate this perception.15 
Notwithstanding the transparent appeal of realist accounts, there are other factors at 
play. Law-based procedural consensus strategies intermingle with the exercise of power 
extrinsic to agreed rules at different stages of the negotiations.16 Rounds tend to start with 
rule-based procedural consensus. However, negotiations are punctuated by the exercise of 
power expose the asymmetries between contracting parties as exemplified by Section 301 
and Special 301 provisions of the US Trade Act of 1974.17 These unilateral measures have 
been complemented by forum-shifting and threat of exiting negotiations.18 Ironically, the call 
for multilateralism during the Uruguay Round has upon completion been followed by frantic 
unilateralism. In particular, a TRIPs-plus strategy to ratchet up IP-standards outside of The 
TRIPS Agreement is being pursued through bilateral treaties.19 
B. Challenges to the Globalisation of Intellectual Property Rights 
Are there any limits to what Steinberg (2002) identifies as the organized hypocrisy of the 
WTO? An answer is beyond the remit of the article, yet it is useful to acknowledge that 
                                                
14 Peter M Gerhart, 'Why Lawmaking for Global Intellectual Property Is Unbalanced', 22 European 
Intellectual Property Review 309 (2000); Peter M Gerhart, 'The Triangulation of International 
Intellectual Property Law: Cooperation, Power, and Normative Welfare', 36 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 1 (2004). 
15 K. E. Maskus, 'Lessons from Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights', 
53 Vanderbilt Law Review 2219 (2000); UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial 
Assessment, (New York and Geneva: United Nations 1994). 
16 R. H. Steinberg, 'In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in 
the GATT/WTO', 56 International Organization 339 (2002). 
17 While scholarly and activist attention tends to be fixated on the US, Peter Drahos, 'Developing 
Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting', 5 The Journal of World Intellectual 
Property 765 (2002), reminds us that in 1984 the European Community enacted a similar provision in 
Council Regulation 264/84, which was not used much because of insufficient consensus.  
18 R. H. Steinberg, above n 16. 
19 Drahos, above n 13, defines TRIPs-plus as provisions that require a Member to either implement 
more extensive standards, or eliminate an option, or introduce new rights. The proliferation of TRIPs-
plus standards through bilaterals will eventually globalize a higher minimum norm outside the TRIPs 
Agreement. 
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‘[P]eople will never trust in the balance of advantages and disadvantages in international 
trade which the GATT approach to intellectual property seeks to impose on them’.20 
Alongside this wariness, Southern negotiators have succeeded in mitigating some of the 
procedural and technical asymmetries in negotiations. Transnational campaigns have played 
a role in transforming the principles of the debate.21 The TRIPs Action Network, a coalition of 
189 NGOs, called for ‘a fundamental re-thinking of TRIPS in the WTO … urging WTO 
members to initiate a process of reviewing and reforming TRIPs’.22 This sentiment recurs in 
the UK government’s Commission on IPRs ‘one size does not fit all’ critique of The TRIPS 
Agreement.23 The UNDP argued that the ‘relevance of TRIPs is highly questionable for large 
parts of the developing world,’ and called for an epistemic revolution with developing 
countries ‘begin[ning] dialogues to replace TRIPs . . . with alternate intellectual property 
paradigms’.24 
Testimony to these challenges is the post-TRIPs proliferation of inter-governmental 
agencies and forums dealing with IPRs. These forums include the World Health 
Organisation25, the Food and Agriculture Organisation26, the Conference of Parties of the 
                                                
20 Hans Ulrich, 'GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development', in F. K. Beier and 
G. Schricker (eds.), GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property, 
(Munich, Germany: Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patents, Copyright and 
Competition Law 1989), 127-159 at 142. 
21 Susan K. Sell and Asim Prakash, 'Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest between Business and 
Ngo Networks in Intellectual Property Rights', 48 International Studies Quarterly 143 (2004). 
22 Anon., 'Joint Ngo Statement: Re-Thinking Trips in the WTO - NGOs Demand Review and Reform of 
Trips at Doha Ministerial Conference', http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/joint5.htm (visited 26 March 
2005). 
23 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, above n 3. 
24 UNDP, Making Global Trade Work for People, (London: Earthscan 2003), at 221-22.  
25 Most recently crystallized in the work of the Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and 
Public Health, set up in 2003 (see http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/en/). 
26 The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture has a number of 
articles with IP provisions, notably Article 12.3(d) requiring that recipients ‘shall not claim any 
intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access’ to plant genetic resources, or their 
‘genetic parts or components’, in the form received from the Multilateral System. 
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Convention on Biological Diversity27, and the UN Commission on Human Rights28 among 
others. In studying forum proliferation scholars note the strategic use of ideas to frame 
debates and capitalize on policy crises. Of particular significance is the Doha Declaration on 
Public Health.29 Beyond being an initiative of the coalition of the weakest, it is a concrete 
indicator of the success of the transnational NGO network. IP law making, it would seem, is 
not the exclusive privilege of the group of actors that succeeded in getting IPRs into GATT; 
thus, suggesting an emerging locus constituted by transnational NGOs and the Africa Group.  
It’s the sequence of events following Doha that point towards a likely reversal. The 
first of these is the withdrawal of the challenge30 to South Africa’s Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act (1997) launched in 1998 by 38 pharmaceutical 
companies31. This amendment sought to help the government to respond to the looming 
HIV/AIDS crisis by, among other things, authorising parallel imports from third countries 
where the drug was being manufactured (cf. Section 15C). Following a transnational NGO 
campaign (Bond, 1999), the companies withdrew their challenge in April 2001. In this 
respect, the negotiations to procure supplies of ciprofloxin by the US and Canadian 
                                                
27 The Convention’s principles, among others, is the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from 
the use of genetic resources. Thus, it has a number of articles with IP-provisions that deal with 
technology transfer, access to and use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, and informed 
consent. 
28 Resolution 2001/33 passed at the 57th session of the Commission recognizes access to medicine, 
particularly in pandemic situations, as a human right. 
29 WTO, Doha Declaration, above n 2; see Susan K. Sell and Asim Prakash, above n 21 for an 
account of the contest of principles and ideas. The politics of ideas aside, there are questions 
concerning the legal status of the Doha Declarations, see for example S. Charnovitz, 'The Legal 
Status of the Doha Declarations', 5 Journal of International Economic Law 207 (2002) and C. Otero 
García-Castrillón, 'The Legal Status of the Doha Declarations', 5 Journal of International Economic 
Law 211 (2002). 
30 An indication of imminent problems was the removal, in 1998, of South Africa from the Generalized 
System of Preferences, a preferential regime for accessing the US market. The following year, the 
country found itself on the S301 watch list. 
31 The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa et al vs The President of the 
Republic of South Africa et al, Notice of Motion, High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial 
Division), 18 February, 1998. 
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governments for treatment of anthrax poisoning in October/November 2001 also played a 
role.32 
Then the US aborted their challenge of compulsory licensing provisions in Brazil’s 
Industrial Property Law No. 9279 (of 1996) and in the Presidential Decree on Compulsory 
Licensing (Decree No 3201 of 6 October, 1999). Controversial, as claimed by the US, was 
the presumption that local working of a patent can only be satisfied by the local production 
and not importation.33 While the US withdrew its challenge, it expressed strong views: ‘The 
United States continues to view local manufacturing requirements as being inimical to the 
principles of free trade and inconsistent with various WTO rules, including the TRIPs 
Agreement. The US government will aggressively engage other countries that impose or 
maintain such requirements and, if appropriate, pursue WTO dispute settlement’.34 
 These events mark a dramatic reversal in the power structures that enframe the 
TRIPs Agreement.35 Others remain cautious on the extent of the shift in power.36 These 
differences aside, the events indicate a hesitation in following through the threats to law 
making in the South. This hesitation is also witnessed in rare instances of reticence by WTO 
Panels to articulate substantive meaning to key standard-setting terms as in the case of 
discrimination in Article 27 by the Canada – Generics Panel (discussed below). Thus, it is fair 
                                                
32 This included news of seeking generic supply from India (see M Joseph, 'Indian Cipro Copies Don’t 
Pay Off', www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,48153,00.html (visited 27 March 2005)) and federal 
appropriation of Bayer’s patent in ciprofloxin and issuing compulsory licenses. 
33 WTO, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Request for Consultation by the United States, 
WT/DS199/1, 8 June 2000. 
34 US Trade Representative, 'Us, Brazil Withdraw HIV/Aids Dispute from WTO Litigation', 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/group8/summit01/wwwh01062512.html, 25 June 2001, last visited 
30 June 2001. 
35 Susan K. Sell and Asim Prakash, above n 21. 
36 Peter Drahos, above n 17. 
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to speculate if this is a harbinger to ‘revise, reinterpret, or supplement intellectual property 
protection standards adopted in the WTO and in WIPO?’37 
III. Residual Flexibility and Ambiguity – The Case of the Canada – Generics Panel 
Report 
A. The Cause for Dispute 
Article 27.1 strongly manifests the loss of sovereign autonomy noted above. This article 
requires patents to be available and enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of 
technology, the place of invention and whether the products are imported or locally 
produced. There are no comparable non-discrimination clauses elsewhere in The TRIPS 
Agreement.38 Article 27.1, it is suggested, was aimed at prohibiting de jure discrimination, 
such as a blanket exclusion of particular subject matter,39 notably pharmaceutical products.40 
The obligation has greater significance in introducing a principle of non-discrimination which 
requires explication, as do the three dimensions of field of technology, place of invention and 
source of product. The Canada – Generics Panel had to deal with these questions, among 
others.41 
 On 19 December 1997, the European Communities and their Member States 
requested consultation with Canada alleging, among others, that patent rights were not 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of technology. The two disputed provisions 
                                                
37 Laurence R. Helfer, 'Regime Shifting: The Trips Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking', 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1 (2004), at 4-5. 
38 UNCTAD & ICTSD, Resource Book on Trips and Development, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2005) at 368-69. 
39 G. B. Dinwoodie and R. C. Dreyfuss, 'International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain 
of Science', 7 Journal of International Economic Law 431 (2004); see also Canada’s submission to the 
WTO Panel, WTO Panel Report, Canada – Generics, above n 4, para 7.90. 
40 Kevin J. Nowak, 'Staying within the Negotiated Framework: Abiding by the Nondisrcimination 
Clause in Trips Article 27', 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 899 (2005). 
41 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Generics, above n 4. 
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were Sections 55.2(1) and 55.2(2).42 The former, known as the regulatory review exception, 
states that ‘[I]t is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use or 
sell the patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information required under any law of Canada, a province or a country other 
than Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product.’ The 
latter, referred to as the stockpiling exception, states that ‘[I]t is not an infringement of a 
patent for any person who makes, constructs, uses or sells a patented invention in 
accordance with subsection (1) to make, construct or use the invention, during the applicable 
period provided for by the regulations,43 for the manufacture and storage of articles intended 
for sale after the date on which the term of the patent expires.’ The European Communities 
claimed that these provisions were inconsistent with obligations under Articles 27.1 and 28.1 
and that to the extent that Section 55.2(2) violates Article 28.1 it is inconsistent with Article 
33. An estimated loss of C$100mn per annum was also alleged.44 
B. The Verdict in Canada – Generics  
The verdict in Canada-Generics has been widely commented upon and the intention is not to 
exhaustively review the literature. Instead, the focus is on the Panel’s views on discrimination 
as this has greater significance to my discussion of the amendments to India’s patent law. 
Some consider the overall decision laudable in applying Article 27.1’s non-discrimination 
principle to Articles 30 and 31.45 Others commend the Chair for his handling of the dispute, 
whilst differing on the interpretation of limited exceptions in Article 30 and the reasoning of 
                                                
42 WTO, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products: Request for Consultations by the 
European Communities, WT/DS/114/1, 12 January 1998. 
43 In the case of pharmaceutical products, the applicable period set out in the Manufacturing and 
Storage of Patented Medicines Regulations is six months, see WTO Panel Report, Canada – 
Generics, above n 4, para 2.1. 
44 Ibid, at para 4.7. 
45 Kevin J. Nowak, above n 40. 
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expanding non-discrimination under Article 27.1 to Articles 30 and 31.46 Other critiques 
appeal for a stronger balance between rights and obligations through use of Articles 7 and 
8.1.47 The Panel’s findings on non-discrimination have been considered most damaging and 
based on flawed principles of treaty interpretation.48 
 As regards the stockpiling exception, Canada, adopting a conventional dictionary 
meaning of limited as ‘confined within definite limits’ or ‘restricted in scope, extent, amount’.49 
Thus, claiming consistency with Article 30 as stockpiling did not impinge on sales to the 
ultimate consumer during the term of protection. In contrast, the EC suggested that limited be 
interpreted as ‘narrow, small, minor, insignificant or restricted’.50 As stockpiling impinged on 
three of the five elements of the rights conferred under Article 28.1, viz. making, using and 
importing, the EC claimed inconsistency. Disagreeing with the genesis of the EC argument, 
the Panel reasoned that the stockpiling exception was not limited: ‘With no limitations at all 
upon the quantity of production, the stockpiling exception removes that protection entirely 
during the last six months of the patent term, without regard to what other, subsequent, 
consequences it might have.  By this effect alone, the stockpiling exception can be said to 
abrogate such rights entirely during the time it is in effect’.51 The emphasis on quantity recurs 
in the Panel’s reasoning when it agrees with the EC that ‘six months was a commercially 
significant period of time, especially since there were no limits at all on the volume of 
production’.52 
                                                
46 Frederick M. Abbott, 'Bob Hudec as Chair of the Canada-Generic Pharmaceuticals Panel - the WTO 
Gets Something Right', 6 Journal of International Economic Law 733 (2003). 
47 G. B. Dinwoodie and R. C. Dreyfuss, above n 39. 
48 Robert Howse, 'The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel. A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous 
Times', 3 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 493 (2000). 
49 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Generics, above n 4, at para. 7.27. 
50 Ibid, at para 7.28. 
51 Ibid, at para 7.34, emphasis added. 
52 Ibid, at para. 7.37. 
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 The Panel’s deliberations on the regulatory review exception makes interesting 
reading for those who explore the contingency and temporality in law. The EC argued that 
the exception was not limited as it abrogated the entire right during the term of protection.53 
In its defence, Canada stated that no commercial sale occurs to the ultimate consumer; 
hence satisfying the requirement for limited exception.54 In presenting its conclusion, the 
Panel observed that the exception had a ‘narrow scope of its curtailment’55 and that it didn’t 
conflict with the normal exploitation of a patent.56 Canada drew the Panel’s attention to 
provisions in US patent law, popularly termed the Bolar provisions57 and similar practice in 
other member countries following their implementation of obligations to The TRIPS 
Agreement.58 It reminded the Panel that the United States agreed to the general language of 
Article 30 on the understanding its patent laws were consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.59 
The Panel acknowledged these points, but ‘did not accord any weight’ to existing US practice 
or understanding.60 Remarkable as this might be, scholars conclude that the Panel’s 
conclusion are ‘hardly surprising’ given practice in US, Germany and new accession states to 
the European Union.61 
                                                
53 Ibid, at para 7.43. 
54 Ibid, at para 7.40. 
55 Ibid, at para 7.45. 
56 Ibid, at para 7.58. 
57 35 United States Code, Section 271(e) which was passed to reverse a federal court decision ruling that the 
scientific use exemption could not be used as a defence against infringement where patented subject matter was 
used for the purpose of making submissions for regulatory approval (Roche Products Inc. v Bolar Pharmaceutical 
Co., Inc, 733 F.2d 858 (C.A.F.C. 1984)). It remains a puzzle as to why the EC never considered challenging the 
US for this provision in its law. For a brief discussion, see WTO Panel Report, Canada – Generics, above n 4, at 
para 7.41. 
58 Ibid, at para 7.42. 
59 Ibid, at para 7.41. 
60 Ibid, at para 7.47. 
61 D Vaver and S Basheer, 'Popping Patented Pills: Europe and a Decade's Dose of Trips', 28 
European Intellectual Property Review 282 (2006), at 284. 
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C. Non-discrimination: Ambiguity in the Panel Report 
As regards non-discrimination, the question facing the Panel was whether non-discrimination 
in Article 27.1 applies across the board and is neutral to wider societal objectives as given in 
Articles 7, 8.1 and 30. The Panel observed that ‘Article 27.1 prohibits discrimination as to the 
enjoyment of ‘patent rights’ without qualifying the term. Article 30 exceptions are explicitly 
described as ‘exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent’ and contain no 
indication that an exemption from non-discrimination rules is intended. A discriminatory 
exception that takes away enjoyment of a patent right is discrimination as much as 
discrimination in the basic right themselves. The acknowledged fact that the Article 31 
exception for compulsory licences and government use is understood to be subject to the 
non-discrimination rule of Article 27.1 without the need for any textual provision so providing, 
further strengthens the case for treating the non-discrimination rules as applicable to Article 
30’.62 The decision, Abbot suggests, is best understood in a political context: ‘In late 1999, 
the political pressures resulting from aggressive US and EC policies on TRIPS were building 
up, but public antipathy towards that conduct had not yet manifested itself at the level 
surrounding the Medicines Act trial in South Africa. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health was about two years off’.63 This is a useful reminder 
notwithstanding the Panel’s own claims of independence from de facto pressure.64 
 In its ruling on non-discrimination, the Panel agreed with the EC that ‘the TRIPS 
Agreement would want to require governments to apply exceptions in a non-discriminatory 
manner, in order to ensure that governments do not succumb to domestic pressures to limit 
exceptions to areas where right holders tend to be foreign producers’.65 Discrimination, the 
Panel suggests, is the ‘results of the unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous 
                                                
62 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Generics, above n 4, at para. 7.91. 
63 Frederick M. Abbott, above n 46, at 736. 
64 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Generics, above n 4, at para. 7.47. 
65 Ibid, at para. 7.92. 
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treatment’ and ‘may arise from explicitly different treatment, sometimes called “de jure 
discrimination”, but it may also arise from ostensibly identical treatment which, due to 
differences in circumstances, produces differentially disadvantageous effects, sometimes 
called “de facto discrimination”’.66 In this particular instance, the Panel was not convinced by 
the evidence presented by the EC that de jure discrimination occurred and was satisfied by 
the assurances from Canada that Section 55.2(1) was not restricted to pharmaceutical 
products as it was scripted in a technologically neutral language.67 Thus, in assessing de 
facto discrimination, the Panel focussed on the ‘effect’ and ‘purpose’ of Section 55.2(1). As 
regards ‘effect’, the Panel held that the EC had not demonstrated that the discriminatory 
effect would be limited to pharmaceutical products.68 Its reasoning on ‘purpose’ is revelatory. 
There was little disagreement between parties on the purpose of the measure, which Canada 
itself made clear was focussed on pharmaceutical products. However, the Panel observed 
that ‘preoccupation with the effects of a statute in one area does not necessarily mean that 
the provisions applicable to other areas are a sham, or of no actual or potential importance’ 
and concluded that ‘[S]o long as the broader application is not a sham, the legislation cannot 
be considered discriminatory’.69 
 Despite this discussion on discrimination, the Panel stepped back from defining the 
term70 and actually found no need to make a precise statement.71 While this reticence is 
exquisite in its ambiguity, some fault lines are identifiable. To begin, Article 27.1 prohibition is 
not absolute but limited to the field of technology, the place of invention and whether the 
products are imported or locally produced. Discrimination based on other factors that are 
                                                
66 Ibid, at para. 7.94. 
67 Ibid, at para. 7.99. 
68 Ibid, at para. 7.102. 
69 Ibid, at para. 7.104. 
70 Ibid, at para. 7.98. 
71 Ibid, at para. 7.105. 
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otherwise consistent with the TRIPs Agreement is not prohibited. There is wisdom here. For 
sometime, evolutionary economists have critiqued the received scholarship on intellectual 
property rights emphasising the sectorally differentiated relationship between IPRs, 
innovation patterns and appropriation strategies.72 This relationship has been empirically 
documented73 and analytically schematized in terms of the mode of technological advance.74 
In cumulative and networked technologies, broad patents and highly disaggregated rights 
can generate an anticommons leading to the underutilisation of the resource.75 Remarkably, 
the US Federal Trade Commission has expressed concern about the detrimental 
consequences of patent thickets in sectors characterized by incremental innovation.76 
 The Panel notes that ‘[A]rticle 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with 
problems that may exist only in certain product areas’.77 Clearly prescient as it predates the 
Doha Declarations on Public Health78 which is testimony to the special circumstances that 
exist in a particular field of technology. Not only have WTO members reaffirmed their 
                                                
72 Giovanni Dosi, 'Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories: A Suggested 
Interpretation of the Determinants and Directions of Technical Change', 11 Research Policy 147 
(1982); Giovanni Dosi, 'Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation', 26 Journal of 
Economic Literature 1120 (1988); Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, 'In Search of a Useful 
Theory of Innovation', 6 Research Policy 36 (1977). 
73 A. K. Klevorick, R. C. Levin, R. R. Nelson and S. G. Winter, 'On the Sources and Significance of 
Interindustry Differences in Technological Opportunities', 24 Research Policy 185 (1995); Edwin 
Mansfield, 'Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study', 32 Management Studies 173 (1986). 
74 Robert P. Merges and Richard P. Nelson, 'On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope', 90 
Columbia Law Review 839 (1990), who identify four broad categories: discrete technologies tend to be 
stand-alone developments (e.g. safety razor, ball-point pens and the toy industry); cumulative 
technologies are where technological advance builds on other technologies, research tools and 
resources (e.g., automobiles, aircrafts, electrical light systems and semiconductors); chemical 
processes is considered unique in that it mixes features of discrete and cumulative models; finally, 
science-based technologies are those where advance is mainly driven by current/recent developments 
in science (e.g. biotechnology, medical diagnostic equipment and nuclear). 
75 M. A. Heller and R. S. Eisenberg, 'Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research', 280 Science 698 (1998). 
76 US Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law and Policy, (Washington DC, USA 2003). 
77 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Generics, above n 4, at para. 7.92. 
78 WTO, Doha Declaration above n 2. 
Dwijen Page 19 of 32 
<Directory> Last printed 28/03/07 
 
commitment to this special treatment79 but measures for differential treatment of 
pharmaceutical products exist.80 In this manner, WTO members give legitimacy to the 
differential treatment of pharmaceutical products. 
 The observation of the Panel on bona fide exceptions was prompted by submissions 
from third parties, which pointed to the puzzle that undifferentiated treatment could 
discriminate against particular fields of technology. Thus, ironically, differential treatment may 
be justified to restore ‘parity of enjoyment’, the US argued.81 Here, obvious reference was to 
the practice in US and elsewhere of patent term extensions ostensibly to balance the 
provision for regulatory-review exceptions. The EC stopped short of emphasising this trade-
off as that would suggest that Section 55.2(1) could be consistent with Article 30 if patent-
term extension were introduced.82 
 India, as third party to the dispute, emphasized its ‘systemic interest’ in terms of the 
balance in TRIPs between private rights and societal interests.83 Further, aligning itself with 
Canada, it found the provisions in dispute have an ‘imperative if the interests of third parties 
were to be fully safeguarded’.84 The next section of the paper explores how this systemic 
interest manifests itself in its domestic law and to what extent does the law deliver on the 
imperative. 
IV. Amending Patent Law in India 
Negotiating conflicting domestic and external exigencies, India decided to use the additional 
transition provisions in Article 65(4) and delay introducing product patents in exempt 
                                                
79 Ibid, at para 4. 
80 Ibid, at para 6 and 7. 
81 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Generics, above n 4, at para. 5.36. 
82 Ibid, at para. 4.41. 
83 Ibid, at para. 5.20. 
84 Ibid, at para. 5.22. 
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technologies till at least 1 January 2005. Ostensibly, this provides an opportunity to benefit 
from changing circumstances to and the growing wisdom in interpreting the TRIPS 
Agreement. Charting the process of coming into full compliance with its patent-related 
obligations at TRIPs, the section evaluates how circumstances and wisdom have been 
exploited. 
A. The First Amendment 
Under Article 65(4) India was obliged to put in place by 1 January, 1995 mechanisms for 
receiving product patent applications in these exempt technologies, the mail-box requirement 
of Article 70(8), and allow for the grant of exclusive marketing rights (Article 70(9)). An 
Ordinance in 1995 and a Bill in 1996 failed to be passed. Thus, setting the stage for the first 
TRIPS dispute in November 1996, with the United States alleging that India had failed to 
implement these obligations.85 The Panel ruled that India’s administrative system was 
inadequate86 and the appellate body broadly upheld the Panel’s decision.87 Subsequently, 
India enacted the first amendment, The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 (No. 17 of 1999), 
adding Chapter IVA titled exclusive marketing rights to the IPA. 
B. The Second Amendment 
Through Article 70(9), India was obliged to fulfil its obligations under Article 65(2) by 1 
January 2000 when the five-year transitional period ended. The Patent (Second Amendment) 
Bill, 1999 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 20 December 1999 and immediately 
referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee of both Houses of Parliament. The Committee 
held 39 meeting, received 42 memoranda, and heard oral testimonies from 51 witnesses and 
                                                
85 WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products: Request for 
Consultations by the United States, WT/DS50/1, 9 July 1996. 
86 WTO Panel Report, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WT/DS50/R, adopted upon amendment by Appellate Body Report on 16 January 1998. 
87 WTO Appellate Body Report, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998. 
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19 individuals and organisations. The Committee also visited a number of countries88.  Based 
on its report, a revised the Bill was presented to Parliament and enacted as Patents 
(Amendment) Act, 2002 (henceforth, the Second Amendment) on 25 June 2002. 
 The Second Amendment introduces over 70 changes to IPA which begin with a 
revision to sections dealing with non-patentable inventions. Such as, an exclusion similar to 
Article 27(2) of TRIPS and an elaborate list of non-patentable inventions (e.g. abstract 
theory, mathematical or business methods, computer programmes, and topography of 
integrated circuits, among others). Reflecting concerns regarding bio-piracy, there are 
changes to the patent application and examination process (cf. Section 10 & 25). The term of 
protection, in Section 53, was revised to come into compliance with Article 33 of TRIPS. 
 Of interest are the changes with respect to compulsory licenses. The Second 
Amendment removed earlier references to the automatic licenses of rights (e.g. sections 86, 
87, 88). Further, Chapter XVI titled working of patents, compulsory licences and revocation 
was substantially revised. Section 84 provides for non-working as a basis for granting 
compulsory licences which includes the non-satisfaction of the ‘reasonable requirements of 
the public’, or that the patented product is not available at a ‘reasonably affordable price’ or it 
is ‘not worked in the territory of India’. This includes adequate commercial production and 
importation that hinders commercial production within India. Section 89(a) mandates the 
Controller to review applications under Section 84 to promote working of patented inventions 
on a ‘commercial scale in the territory of India without undue delay and to the fullest extent 
that is reasonably practicable’. In Section 92, dealing with compulsory licences on account of 
national emergency, extreme urgency or public non-commercial use, the earlier reference to 
working of a patent in India has been deleted. 
                                                
88 This included Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan and South Korea. Srividhya Ragavan, 
'Patent Amendments in India in the Wake of Trips', 8 CASRIP Newsletter 5 (2002), expresses 
disappointment at the exclusion of the US concluding that ‘[t]he elaborate tour of the world can now be 
interpreted as one more effort by India just to be stubborn and irrational when dealing with WTO 
issues’. 
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 A number of commentators have expressed surprise at this script and suggest it 
conflicts with The TRIPS Agreement.89 Daya Shanker90 provides an elaborate explanation of 
the compatibility of non-working with TRIPs obligation. It is here that the aborted US 
challenge of compulsory license provisions in Brazil’s laws is significant, which some have 
considered legally weak91. In maintaining non-working, India demonstrates its intent to 
explore space left open by legal ambiguity. 
 Coming into substantive compliance with The TRIPS Agreement required expanding 
the patent rights conferred in Section 48 to include importation. Following this, Section 107A 
was introduced to identify non-infringing acts. Paragraph (a) introduces the regulatory review 
exception which is akin to what was in dispute in the Canada – Generics case. Using the 
doctrine of international exhaustion, paragraph (b) makes importation of a patented product 
from a duly authorized person for sale or distribution a non-infringing act. Both these 
provisions indicate a desire to incorporate residual flexibility in The TRIPS Agreement and 
use recent Panel pronouncements. 
C. The Third Amendment 
Finally, product patents in exempt technologies were to be enacted through the Patents 
(Amendment) Bill, 2003, but this lapsed with the dissolution of Parliament. The new 
government, the Congress-led and Left-backed, United Progressive Alliance introduced a 
marginally revised version as the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (Ord. No. 7 of 
2004) (henceforth, the Ordinance) in light of the 1 January, 2005 deadline. Popular protest to 
the Ordinance organized through the Joint Action Committee against Amendment of the 
Indian Patent Act drew attention to residual flexibilities in the TRIPs Agreement that were not 
                                                
89 Ibid, and Srividhya Ragavan, 'Can't We All Get Along? The Case for a Workable Patent Model', 23 
Arizona State Law Journal 117 (2003), who expands the discussion. 
90 Daya Shanker, 'India, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS, 5 The Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 315 (2002); Daya Shanker, 'Brazil, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the WTO', 5 
The Journal of World Intellectual Property 53 (2002). 
91 Ibid. 
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being used.92 Many of these recommendations, as will be discussed shortly, were 
incorporated into the Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2005 which later was passed by Parliament. 
At issue is whether there were opportunities that the debate failed to recognize and/or 
legislators failed to enact. Issues debated can be broadly classified into two groups: 
• The criterion of patentability: conditions for grant of protection, pre- and post-grant 
opposition, and exclusions from patentability. 
• Access to medicine: opening the mail-box, Doha provisions and compulsory licenses. 
 The first set of issues relate to practices of building patent thickets by securing 
multiple and overlapping patents around a single invention93. This raises transaction costs 
particularly in those sectors characterized by cumulative, networked and path-dependent 
technological trajectories. In pharmaceuticals, thickets arise when minor modifications like 
changes in size, colour, dosage, delivery mechanism, and composition, around a known and 
patented molecule are either simultaneously or sequentially patented. In addition, new 
formulations and combinations of existing active ingredients are also protected by patents. 
Between 1989 and 2000, of the 1035 new drug applications approved by the US Food and 
Drug Administration, 361 (or, 35%) were for new chemical entities and the balance, 65%, 
were incrementally modified drugs.94 De facto, these practices render non-existent the finite 
time-limit of patent terms as new patents continue to keep the subject matter under 
protection; hence the term of evergreening patents.95 This is not new; the 1959 US Senate 
                                                
92 Joint action committee against amendment of the Indian Patent Act, 'Declaration', 3 January 2005, 
available at http://pd.cpim.org/2005/0116/01162004_patemts%20stmn.htm (visited 26 March 2005). 
93 For a recent treatment see the US Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper 
Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, (Washington DC, USA 2003). 
94 National Institute for Health Care Management, Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
(Washington DC, USA 2002). 
95 Ibid; a recent example would be the anti-histamine, Fexofenadine, which Aventis initially patented in 
1979 (US Patent No. 4,254,129). In 1996, prior to the expiry of this patent Aventis was granted a 
patent claiming a substantially pure compound, discussed in Padmashree Gehl-Sampath, Economic 
Aspects of Access to Medicine after 2005: Product Patent Protection and Emerging Firm Strategies in 
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Committee headed by Kefauver noted that many patents involved molecules that were 
manipulated and therapeutically similar to previous molecules.96 During the debate in India, 
commentators drew attention to the 8,000 plus applications for product patents in the mail-
box during a period (1995-2003) when the US Federal Drug Administration is said to have 
approved only 274 new chemical entities; thus, suggesting that a substantial number of 
applications were either me-too drugs or incremental modifications. 
 It is to practices like these that amendments to the Ordinance were proposed, 
recommending, inter alia, clearer language to raise the goal-posts for patentable subject 
matter and clarify exclusions from patentability. Amendments to the Ordinance included: 
• In Section 2(ja), the definition of inventive step was amended with the addition of the 
following italicized text: an invention that involves technical advance as compared to 
existing knowledge or having economic significance or both and that makes the invention 
not obvious to a person skilled in the art. 
• A definition for ‘pharmaceutical substance’ was introduced that had the phrase ‘any new 
entity involving one or more inventive step’. 
• Section 3(d), exceptions to patentability97, was re-drafted to read as follows: the mere 
discovery of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known 
efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a 
known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless 
such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant. 
                                                                                                                                                     
the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, Studies prepared for the WHO's Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, (Geneva 2005). 
96 William S Comanor, 'The Political Economy of the Pharmaceutical Industry', 24 Journal of Economic 
Literature 1178 (1986). 
97 In 2006, the Chennai Patent Office rejected Novartis’s patent application for Glivec, an anti-cancer 
drug, citing several grounds including Section 3(d). Later in May, Novartis filed several writs claiming, 
among other, that Section 3(d) is arbitrary, illogical and conflicts with the TRIPs Agreement, see Sarah 
Hiddleston, Patent Trouble, Frontline, vol. 24, (2007). 
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• Provisions for pre-grant opposition were reinstated. 
 The second set of issues relate to access to medicine. As Abbott98 notes, one of the 
issues concerned patent applications lying in the mail-box where the eventual grant of a 
patent could compromise the continuation of existing production into the future. The 
Ordinance failed to recognize the problem despite introducing provisions for opening-up the 
mail-box (cf. Section 11A(7)). Following criticism, the government introduced two measures. 
First, production can continue on cumulatively meeting the following conditions: substantial 
investment has been incurred, production and marketing has commenced prior to and 
continues subsequent to 1 January 2005, and a reasonable royalty rate is paid to the 
patentee. And, second, patentees cannot institute infringement proceedings against these 
producers. 
 The Ordinance was also criticized for not incorporating Doha measures. Even while 
India was active in the deliberations leading to the August 2003 Decision,99 the Ordinance 
did not incorporate these provision. Responding to this lacuna, section 92A(1) was amended 
with the addition of the following text: ‘or such country has by notification or otherwise 
allowed importation of the patented pharmaceutical products from India’. To complete this 
amendment, section 90(1)(vii) was redrafted to allow production under a compulsory license 
to also be exported upon meeting stipulated conditions. 
 Two recommendations from the Left parties, exclusion of micro-organisms from 
patentability and the introduction of a specific definition for new entities, were rejected and 
                                                
98 Frederick M. Abbott, 'The Trips Agreement, Access to Medicines, and the WTO Doha Ministerial 
Conference', 5 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 15 (2002). 
99 WTO, Decision of the General Council on Implementing Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, 
WT/L/540, adopted 30 August 2003. The key breakthrough meeting to secure an agreement was 
convened by Chair of the TRIPs Council, Vanu Gopala Menon of Singapore, and delegates from 
Brazil, India, Kenya, South Africa and US. 
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later referred to the Technical Expert Group on Patents chaired by Dr RS Mashelkar.100 
Among the tasks, the Expert Group had to consider whether ‘it would be TRIPs compliant to 
limit the grant of patents for pharmaceutical substance to new chemical entity or to new 
medical entity involving one or more inventive steps’.  
 The Expert Group received written and oral submissions from a variety of quarters 
and published their findings in December 2006.101 Disturbingly, there is no legal analysis or 
references to the literature. Thus, summarily it concludes that the proposed exclusion is 
‘likely’ to contravene TRIPs obligations102 and tantalisingly notes the ‘perception that even 
the current provisions in the Patents Act could be held to be TRIPS non-compliant’.103 
Unfortunately, we are neither told why this is likely nor whose perceptions were considered. 
D. Discussion 
This analysis of amendments to IPA show that there were mixed use of residual flexibility in 
The TRIPS Agreement and efforts to explore legal ambiguity. To begin, following the 
domestic exigencies that delayed implementing obligations under Article 65(4), India was 
self-assured enough to go through a WTO dispute and also appeal the decision. In the 
Second Amendment, in retaining local working it demonstrated its effort to exploit the legal 
ambiguity that arose from the withdrawal of US’s challenge of Brazil patent laws. With 
respect to the Canada – Generics decision, it introduced provisions similar to the regulatory 
review exception. By not exploring the stockpiling exception it treaded a careful line. As 
noted earlier, the Panel’s emphasis on the absence of quantitative limits to the stockpiling 
                                                
100 Anon., Statement Issued at the Press Conference of the Four Left Parties, People's Democracy, 27 
March 2005. 
101 Anon., Report of the Technical Expert Group on Patent Law Issues, (New Delhi 2006), available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/india/ (visited 20 February 2007). Following allegations of plagiarism, 
which Mashelkar accepted, the report was withdrawn on 19 February 2007. 
102 Ibid, at para 5.6. 
103 Ibid, at para 5.11. 
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exception suggests a route around its conclusion that stockpiling violates The TRIPS 
Agreement. 
 It is with respect to the Panel’s deliberations on the ambiguous space between 
differential treatment and (legitimate) discrimination that India’s ambivalence is revealing. On 
the one hand, Section 3(d) introduced in the Third Amendment while reasonably neutral in its 
script is largely directed at the practice of evergreening patents.104 This clause has an 
interesting genealogy. Though unique to Indian statutes it parallels guidelines that are 
otherwise given to Patent Offices elsewhere. Thus, for example, the European Patent Office 
has guidelines on how to apply patent standards for particular technologies.105 Similarly, the 
US Patent and Trademark Office have specific guidelines for biotechnological inventions that 
spell out particular utility requirements.106 As such, Member Countries are free to determine 
the standards of patentability and strong and higher standards have often been 
recommended for Southern members.107 
 On the other hand, the Left Parties proposed exclusions were rejected and submitted 
to an Expert Group. Without revealing their analysis, the Expert Group summarily found the 
proposed exclusion in conflict with The TRIPS Agreement and even suggested that existing 
provisions are felt to be in conflict with The TRIPS Agreement. It is a strange situation for the 
                                                
104 Here, see the response of Kamal Nath, Minister for Commerce and Industry, to questions in the 
Lok Sabha (Lower House) where concern on evergreening patents was raised: ‘There are so many 
provisions here. In regard to evergreening, I just want to read out section 3(d) …There is no question 
of evergreening. There is no question that our compulsory licensing is loose … I believe that I have 
tried to explain the apprehensions which the Members had.  I believe that some of their fears have 
been allayed and I seek the support of the House to pass this Bill’. See Lok Sabha Debates (22 March 
2005), http://164.100.24.230/datalshom001/dailydeb/22032005.htm, (visited 13 March 2007). 
105 Directive 2004/27/EC/ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 Amending 
Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use. 
106 US Patents and Trademark Office ‘Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance with 
Utility Requirements’ 66 Fed Reg 1092 (5 January 2001). 
107 For example, the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, above n 3 at 114-16, is of the view 
that ‘[T]here is therefore ample scope for developing countries to determine for themselves how strictly 
the common standards under TRIPS should be applied and how the evidential burden should be 
allocated’ and then proceeds to conclude that ‘[T]he objective of any standard should be to ensure that 
routine increments to knowledge, involving minimal creative input, should not generally be patentable’. 
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government to have its Expert Group report back that there are likely conflicts with The 
TRIPS Agreement. The Panel’s reticence to define discrimination left open an opportunity to 
explore novel law-making. Moreover, its deliberations indicated to a number of fault lines. 
The TRIPS Agreement only prohibits discrimination on the grounds of technology, location of 
invention and source of product. In addition, there is space to treat technologies differently 
and it is also possible to have bona fide exceptions directed at particular product areas. The 
distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination was also revealing. Having expressed 
its systemic interest and noted the imperative underlying provisions in Canada’s laws, the 
government appears to have failed to meet its pledge domestically. 
V. Conclusion 
This article sought to explore how changing circumstances in implementing and interpreting 
the TRIPS Agreement alongside continuing legal ambiguity might translate into law-making 
in India with respect to amendments to IPA. The evidence indicates a mixed use of residual 
flexibility and limited effort to explore legal ambiguity. Thus, for example, the Second 
Amendment maintained a revised local working requirement – a principle that US disputes 
but fails to challenge at the WTO – and simultaneously introduced a regulatory review 
exception. On the other hand, no substantive effort was made to explore the ambiguity 
concerning non-discrimination in Article 27(1) despite the reticence of a WTO Panel to step 
back and not define this key term. For that matter, apart from the proposal from the Left 
Parties, the debate failed to raise this point. The response of the government to this proposal 
is demonstrative of deepening ambivalence on IPRs. In this conclusion, I elaborate on this 
ambivalence. 
 A useful preface to the government’s ambivalence is the legislation implementing 
obligations under Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, Protection of Plant Varieties and 
Farmers’ Right Act, 2001. This is legally imaginative in fulfilling TRIPS obligations whilst also 
introducing rights for farmers. The latter is achieved by incorporating rights (farmers’ rights) 
and principles (e.g. access and benefit sharing) that reside in countervailing forums like the 
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Food and Agriculture Organisation and the Convention on Biological Diversity. Thus, the 
different outcomes in the area of patents could be reflective of the sectoral interests that 
permeate the industries and influence the government. For that matter, even in the area of 
plants there have been different influences. Notable in this respect were regulatory changes 
introduced through the 1980s that began with the release of publicly bred varieties to the 
private sector (1983) and were followed by relaxation of industrial licensing laws (1987). In 
fact, in 1990 – well before the completion of the TRIPs Agreement – the Government 
considered introducing plant breeder rights.108 In 1986, the government considered joining 
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. The response from industry 
was mixed. The lobby group representing trade and industry interests, the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM), came out in support of membership 
whereas the primary organ of Indian industry, the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI) opposed the membership. Supporting FICCI was the lobby 
group representing the (small) domestic generic drug firms, the Indian Drug Manufacturers 
Association (IDMA). 
 The pharmaceutical industry was initially distributed between two lobby groups: the 
mainly domestic grouping of generic firms under IDMA and the MNC-affiliated grouping of 
the Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI).109 However, in 1999 a new 
configuration of pharmaceutical firms was established, the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance 
(henceforth, the Alliance), consisting of firms like Cipla, Dr Reddy’s Laboratories, Lupin Labs 
and Ranbaxy that collectively account for 30% of domestic production and 33% of Indian 
                                                
108 For a discussion see, Dwijen Rangnekar, ‘Plant breeding in an era of privatisation: reflections on 
transformations in the Indian seed industry’, in F-J Richter and Parthasarathi Banerjee (eds.) The 
Knowledge Economy in India (London: Palgrave Macmillan), 130-48. 
109 It is also the case that these two groups share common cause in terms of relaxing price regulations 
under the DPCO, Praful Bidwai, ‘One Step Forward, Many Steps Back: Dismemberment of India’s 
National Drug Policy’, 1 Development Dialogue 193 (1995). Even generic drug companies have come 
under the scrutiny of the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority for alleged mark-up pricing, see S. 
Sardana, ‘Govt. probes over-pricing of generic drugs’ The Indian Express, 28 July 2005, available at 
www.indianexpress.com (visited 7 April 2005). 
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exports.110 The Alliance is composed of pharmaceutical firms with mixed interests and areas 
of expertise: ‘[the Alliance]….is perhaps a little schizophrenic about where its members’ 
interests lie. On the one hand many of them, such as Ranbaxy, wish to develop as research 
based companies and see the value of strong patent protection to achieve that. On the other 
hand, the overwhelming majority of their revenues remain derived from generic production, 
and accordingly they share many of the concerns of IDMA’.111 
 Lobby group re-shuffling is symptomatic of the structural and economic 
transformations in the industry. A recent study on Indian pharma finds a group of indigenous 
(and some MNC-affiliated) firms adopting a mix of cooperative and competitive strategies.112 
Beyond being keen on owning IPRs, these firms have adopted the following: exploring non-
infringing processes, research on new chemical entities and generics, focussing on new drug 
delivery systems and biopharmaceutical research. On the one hand, some firms see their 
future in exploiting their comparative advantages in process innovations; thus, seizing the 
generic drug route. However, for these firms the domestic market presents a constraint on 
account of relatively low per capita income, limited access to medicine and negligible 
insurance coverage. Consequently, exports are their source of growth. Indian companies 
have sought approval for generic production of some 150 drugs in the US, of which approval 
for nearly 90 has been granted. The US market itself accounts for sizeable revenues of 
leading members of the Alliance: 32% in the case of Dr. Reddy's and 42% for Ranbaxy. 
Other Alliance members have achieved success in developing new molecules and are 
interested in seeking domestic and overseas protection. This competency has sparked of 
strategic alliances between domestic and foreign firms that go beyond one-off technology 
                                                
110 Anon., 'Dr Anji Reddy Becomes New President of Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance', 
www.pharmabiz.com (visited 7 April 2005). 
111 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 'Notes on the India Field-Trip', 
www.iprcommission.org, 2001 (visited 14 April 2002). 
112 This paragraph is based on Padmashree Gehl-Sampath, above n 92, unless indicated otherwise. 
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transfers of a previous era and enter areas of shared research, overseas production and 
global marketing.113  
 The government itself is well aware of these structural transformations that follow 
from the IPA and have also enabled the industries integration into global supply chains of 
pharma production and innovation. This is well captured in the Minister of Commerce, Kamal 
Nath’s, statement to Parliament introducing the Third Amendment: ‘The pharma industry and 
the IT industry are the two sunrise sectors for India. The Ordinance amending the Patent Act 
provides for an enabling environment for both of these. Among the sectors that have 
experienced the greatest transformation in India, the pharmaceutical industry is perhaps the 
most significant. …the transformed Indian pharma industry is itself looking for patent 
protection ….[…] Apart from the manufacture of drugs, the pharma industry offers huge 
scope for outsourcing of clinical research’.114 
 This explanation demonstrates that in moving analysis away from the Geneva 
process and towards national capitals there are a variety of other factors that come to 
influence law-making in intellectual property rights. It is well-established that technical 
assistance and programmes from the World Intellectual Property Organisation play a role in 
shaping legislation in the South.115 Often an inclination to avoid a WTO dispute directs 
technical assistance towards close compliance and TRIPs-plus measures.116 However, in the 
case of India this may not be a substantial factor in light of the ambivalence within 
government and the changing economic interests of parts of Indian pharma. As enforcement 
of TRIPs-obligations become more contested in the future activists and scholars will need to 
                                                
113 GD Sandhya and S. Visalakshi, 'R&D Capability and Alliance Formation in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry in India', 27 Science and Public Policy 109 (2000). 
114 Kamal Nath ‘Statement on the Ordinance relating to Patents (Third) Amendment’, 28 December 
2004, available at www.cptech.org; last accessed 30 March 2005. 
115 Peter Drahos, above n 17. 
116 Ibid. 
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attend to the problematic of glocal factors. In this respect, the paper seeks to highlight how 
those factors come to play in implementing TRIPs obligations. 
 A final comment on the global civil society campaigns is also warranted in light of this 
call for sharing our attention on the Geneva-process with the dynamics of TRIPs-
implementation and resistance in national capitals. Global civil society organisations have 
played a key role in mitigating much of the technical and procedural asymmetries in 
negotiating TRIPs. Their campaigns and forum shifting strategies have been effective. 
However, in as much as organisations differ, the forums selected for agenda-setting also 
differ. Some commentators note that the selection of the World Health Organisation as a 
forum by the ‘Access to Medicine’ Campaign may not be seen as an effort to roll-back IPRs; 
rather the agenda it sought was to use the residual flexibility in The TRIPS Agreement.117 In 
this narrative, the World Health Organisation is portrayed as being equally reconciliatory and 
equally pragmatic. This begs the question whether such global campaigns and forum-
selection have set too narrow an agenda for TRIPs-implementation? And, by extension, how 
these global campaigns and agendas relate to and influence domestic law-making in 
Member countries. As the paper on India reminds us, writing about TRIPs from the sites of 
implementing the obligations bring out new areas of resistance and new avenues for 
opposition. It is equally important and necessary to make this epistemic change. 
 
                                                
117 Laurence R. Helfer, above n 37 at 40-49. 
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